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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4166 
_____________ 
 
COLIN GRAU, a minor, by his parents; SCOTT GRAU; BRENDA GRAU, in their own 
right 
 
v. 
 
NEW KENSINGTON-ARNOLD SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROBERT FALLONE; 
ROBERT SAURO; CAROL ANSANI; BEVERLY MEYER; DEBBIE GLUSHENKO; 
TRACI YORK; PATRICK PETIT; GEORGE BATTERSON; WAYNE PERRY; ERIC 
DOUTT; AUDREY SLEIGH; JON BANKO; JEFFREY THIMONS, all such individuals 
being sued in their individual and official capacities 
 
 
Scott Grau; Brenda Grau,  
 
         Appellants 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Civ. No. 2-10-cv-00111) 
District Judge:  Hon. David S. Cercone 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 11, 2011 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed May 26, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Scott and Brenda Grau appeal the District Court‟s order adopting the 
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge dismissing their complaint.  For the 
reasons stated below, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
I. 
We write for the parties‟ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.
1
 
Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and their minor son, who was 
tragically killed in a vehicular accident during his senior year of high school.  Plaintiffs‟ 
son was enrolled at Valley High School, located in the New Kensington-Arnold School 
District in Pennsylvania, during the 2008-2009 academic year.  On January 21, 2009, 
plaintiffs‟ son and a second student exited Valley High School before the conclusion of 
the school day without authorization from school officials.  Plaintiffs‟ son subsequently 
left the school‟s premises as a passenger in a vehicle operated by the second student.  The 
car pulled out of the school‟s parking lot and entered a northbound lane of Route 366, a 
four-lane highway upon which Valley High School is located.  Shortly thereafter, the 
student driver lost control of his vehicle and collided with an oncoming pick-up truck.  
Plaintiffs‟ son was pronounced dead at the scene of the accident.   
                                              
1
  The following facts are taken from plaintiffs‟ complaint.  All alleged facts are assumed 
to be true, and we draw all inferences in plaintiffs‟ favor.  Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 
438, 442 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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Defendants consist of the school district and various school officials.  During the 
time period relevant to this appeal, the defendant school district maintained a written 
policy that mandated a “closed campus.”  Pursuant to this policy, students were required 
to obtain authorization from a school official in order to leave campus.  Failure to obtain 
the proper authorization constituted a violation of the closed campus policy and resulted 
in the penalty of suspension.   
In addition to the closed campus policy, the school district also maintained a 
written parking policy.  The parking policy allowed students to obtain school parking 
permits, but subjected these parking privileges to certain conditions.  One of these 
conditions forbade the use of a vehicle to leave campus during the school day without 
permission from a school official.  A second condition prohibited the use of a vehicle to 
transport any fellow student without such permission.  Violating either of these 
conditions resulted in the loss of the school-issued parking permit.   
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 26, 2010, alleging that defendants 
“intentionally ignored and otherwise consciously decided not to enforce” these policies 
by (1) deactivating a system that monitored student entry and exit to and from the high 
school; (2) failing to implement a surveillance of the school‟s parking lot; and (3) not 
maintaining security at the doors of the school.  Appendix (“App.”) 42a-43a.  This 
“refusal to enforce the closed campus policy . . . was widely known to students,” and 
“[a]s a result, . . . students frequently exited the school and drove off of school grounds 
during the middle of the day.”  App. 43a.  Plaintiffs allege that defendants were not only 
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cognizant of the fact that students were leaving the school without permission, App. 43a, 
but also knew that Route 366 was a “dangerous highway,” App. 40a, and that students 
“were inexperienced and unskillful drivers [] that [] posed a grave risk of danger to any 
passengers who traveled with them to and from [the school],” App. 42a.    
Based on these allegations, plaintiffs‟ complaint asserts two claims:  (1) a 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim predicated on the “state-created 
danger” theory of liability, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) a Pennsylvania 
state-law claim for willful misconduct, brought pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550.
2
  
On February 22, 2010, defendants moved to dismiss these claims pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In a Report and Recommendation dated 
June 30, 2010, the Magistrate Judge recommended that defendants‟ motion be granted.  
The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in a Memorandum Order 
dated September 22, 2010.  This timely appeal followed.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo.  McTernan v. City of 
York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to 
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  Plaintiffs‟ complaint also states a third claim for “loss of society and companionship.”  
The claim was subsequently withdrawn, however, and is not relevant to this appeal.      
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relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fowler 
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their federal claim as well as their state-law 
claim.  We will discuss each in turn. 
A. 
 Plaintiffs‟ federal claim, asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that 
defendants violated the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment‟s due 
process clause pursuant to a “state-created danger” theory.  We first recognized this 
theory of liability in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).  In Kneipp and later 
cases, we set forth the four requisite elements to plead adequately a state-created danger 
claim:   
(1) the harm ultimately caused must have been foreseeable and fairly direct; 
 
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; 
 
(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff 
was a foreseeable victim of the defendant‟s acts, or a member of a discrete class of 
persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state‟s actions, as 
opposed to a member of the public in general; and 
 
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a 
danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than 
had the state not acted at all. 
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Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (footnotes and 
quotations omitted); see also Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208.   
The Report and Recommendation adopted by the District Court held that plaintiffs 
failed to allege facts sufficient to plead adequately the first and fourth elements of this 
claim.  We agree. 
In regard to the first element, two prior cases involving the state-created danger 
theory of liability are instructive.  In Morse, a local resident entered a school building 
through an unlocked door and shot and killed a teacher.  The plaintiffs in that case 
alleged that the state had created the danger by leaving one entrance of the school open 
and unlocked in order to facilitate a construction project.  We held that these allegations 
failed to establish that the injury was a “fairly direct” result of the defendant‟s actions, 
determining that the link between the defendants‟ action and the subsequent harm was 
“too attenuated” given that “it was not defendants‟ decision to allow the rear entrance to 
the school to remain open that precipitated or was the catalyst for the attack.”  Morse, 132 
F.3d at 909, 910.  By contrast, in Kneipp, police officers left a visibly inebriated woman 
alone by the road in cold weather; that woman subsequently fell and suffered severe 
injuries resulting from exposure.  We held that a reasonable juror could find that those 
injuries were a foreseeable and fairly direct consequence of the state‟s actions.  Kneipp, 
95 F.3d at 1208.   
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In this case, plaintiffs fail to allege facts to create a plausible inference that the 
refusal of defendants to take various measures to enforce the “closed campus” policy – 
such as implementing a surveillance of the parking lot or maintaining security at the 
doors of the school – “precipitated” or served as the “catalyst” for the subsequent and 
tragic accident.  There are various intervening causes, including both students‟ voluntary 
decision to leave school early in violation of both written school policy and Pennsylvania 
state truancy law, plaintiffs‟ son‟s choice to ride as a passenger in a fellow student‟s 
vehicle, and most significantly, the fact that the student driver lost control of his vehicle.  
As in Morse – and unlike in Kneipp – the connection between defendants‟ actions and the 
subsequent harm is simply “too attenuated” to satisfy the “fairly direct” component of the 
first element of a state-created danger claim.
3
   
For similar reasons, plaintiffs have failed to plead adequately the fourth element of 
their state-created danger claim.  We have held that “[t]here must be a direct causal 
relationship between the affirmative act of the state and plaintiff's harm” in order to 
satisfy this element.  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir. 2006).  For 
example, in Morse, we deemed the plaintiff‟s allegation that keeping the rear entrance of 
the school building unlocked “increased the risk” of harm insufficient, instead requiring 
                                              
3
  Plaintiffs rely solely on Mohammed v. School District of Philadelphia, 196 F. App‟x 79 
(3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished), to argue this point in their brief.  As an initial matter, we 
remark that unpublished not precedential “opinions are not regarded as precedents that 
bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing.”  Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedure 5.7.  In any event, Mohammed is not inconsistent with our 
holding. 
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allegations that “the act or omission of the state actor [] directly place[] the victim in 
harm‟s way.”  Morse, 132 F.3d at 915.  In Kneipp, by contrast, we held that a reasonable 
jury could find that defendants placed the victim directly in harm‟s way, since “but for 
the intervention of the police, [the intoxicated woman‟s husband] would have continued 
to escort [the woman] back to their apartment where she would have been safe.”  Kneipp, 
95 F.3d at 1209.  In this case, while plaintiffs‟ allegations may suffice to establish an 
inference that defendant‟s actions increased the risk that students would leave school 
early, plaintiffs‟ complaint fails to give rise to a plausible inference that defendants 
directly placed their son in harm‟s way, and thus does not satisfy the fourth element‟s 
“direct causal relationship” requirement.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs‟ § 1983 claim.   
B. 
 Plaintiffs‟ second claim for willful misconduct alleges a violation of 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 8550.  Willful misconduct for purposes of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550 occurs only if 
“„the actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that it was 
substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied.‟”  Bright, 443 F.3d at 
287 (quoting Robbins v. Cumberland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 802 A.2d 1239, 
1252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)).  There are no allegations here that give rise to a plausible 
inference that defendants “desired” to injure plaintiffs‟ son or were aware that such injury 
was “substantially certain to follow, so that desire can be implied” from the failure to 
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enforce properly the school‟s closed campus policy.  We thus will affirm the dismissal of 
plaintiffs‟ state-law claim.  
IV. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm.   
